The Schlieffen Plan was originated by Count von Schlieffen (once the head the Prussian General Staff, the "brains" of the Prussian/German Army). He developed this plan by carefully studying the results of the Russo-Japanese war. Schlieffen was one of the few generals at the time who had grasped the enormous destructive potential of the machine gun, artillery, and the defensive potential of fortifications. Although his plan (developed in the likely case of attacks from both Russia and France) was risky and bold, if successful, it would place the German Empire at the top of the European military mountain. In this paper, I will explain the original Plan's strengths and weaknesses, and how and why the modified Plan failed.
To understand the Schlieffen Plan, you must understand the thought behind it. Schlieffen was a master strategist, and he devoted his life to the German military machine. He was Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1905, and ever since his wife's death in 1872, he constantly worked with a religious fervor. Even after an accident had led him to retirement, Schlieffen still worked endlessly on the Plan (which he first formulated in 1894), and would inform the General Staff of his suggestions.[1]
Schlieffen had studied every aspect of the inevitable war against France and Russia, and put every ounce of his knowledge into the Plan. He especially studied the French military doctrine of the day to help him better understand how the enemy would react to his moves. His studying paid off. The French Plan XVII (developed for the same situation that the Schlieffen Plan envisioned) was the final distillation of France's attack-happy military doctrine. Schlieffen took Plan XVII into account, and tailored his Plan to work around it. It turns out that Plan XVII was perfectly suited for allowing the Germans to win the war.[2] In fact, during wargames (which the Germans were fond of, and used greatly to shape strategy), the Germans found that one of the quickest way to defeat France was when France was using strategies similar to Plan XVII (of course, the Germans did not have a copy of Plan XVII).[3]
Schlieffen recognized that Germany could not afford to fight a war of attrition (a fight where each side tries to wear the other side out) against France and Russia. He realized that the only possible way for Germany to win against both forces was to rapidly defeat France, while Russia was still mobilizing. Schlieffen estimated that he would have six weeks to crush France. If France was not defeated by then, Germany would most likely lose the war of attrition which would ensue.[4]
Keeping this in mind, Schlieffen proceeded to develop his Plan. He knew how long a fortified city could take to destroy (knowledge gained from the siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese war), so he equipped his army with heavy siege guns.[5] Later, the internal combustion engine would provide the power to move these guns onto the field. He also saw the need for a good internal railroad system to transport supplies and men inside the country. In fact, he even started a Railroad Corps to ensure that the railroads in both Germany and in captured territory were operating smoothly enough to keep the Plan on schedule.[6]
The Plan's concept was simple. Schlieffen knew that France would concentrate between Belfort and Sedan, and would try to take Alsace-Lorraine. These areas had little strategic significance, but were historically French territories. The German army on the left side of the front would feint, then quickly pull back to draw the French armies farther away from Paris (where about ninety percent of the German army would end up). The German armies would continue to fall back, trading ground for time. Then, after reaching heavily fortified, mountainous, and wooded areas of Alsace and Lorraine, the German armies would defend, then counter-attack. The French armies would have little choice but to either go into Switzerland (and be interned) or to be destroyed.[7]
On the right hand side of the Western Front, about ninety percent of the German army was to attack. Not a straight out, frontal attack, but in a scythe motion so that the Germans would be attacking French flanks (traditionally the best way to win a battle). They would be going through much less heavily defended (and neutral) Belgium and the Netherlands, then go along the coast[8], and finally swing back in to attack the heart of France (and with it, Paris)[9], where all of the attacking forces would meet. Who would win the battle of Paris, however, was questionable. The lever would swing around the city of Metz.[10] This entrapment would ensure French defeat in weeks. Then, every man not needed for the occupation of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands would move at top speed to the Eastern Front.
On the Eastern Front, token forces were left to defend East Prussia. They were to pull back if necessary. The size of this force was intentionally small for a few reasons. First, it is much easier to defend. This is especially true when you have fortifications and machine guns, and the enemy walks on foot, with outdated equipment, little ammunition, almost no artillery, and has to cross rivers to get to you, as was the case. Second, every available man was needed on the Western Front. Finally, Schlieffen didn't mind losing a little bit of land, knowing that the whole army would go East in six weeks.[11] One interesting piece of knowledge: Great Britain and France had gotten and early copy of the Plan (but it still had the main ideas of the Plan in it) in 1905. Joffre (the French commanding general at the beginning of the war) based his Plan XVII on this.[12] Even with nine years to study it, Joffre still made the mistake of trying for Alsace-Lorraine![13] Added to this problem, the French had greatly underestimated the German military strength.[14]
This is the whole Plan, a simple encircling on the right side in the West, a taunt on the left to draw the enemy in, and a standard defence in the East. Why didn't Germany win the War with this seemingly perfect plan? After Schlieffen retired, a new Chief-of-Staff was chosen, naturally. This new head of the Army was Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke, the nephew of Helmuth Karl Bernard von Moltke. The elder Moltke (Helmuth Karl Bernard) was the Chief-of-Staff during the Franco-Prussian War. He led the Prussian Army to glory and victory. Kaiser Wilhelm II thought that genius ran in the family, so the younger Moltke was chosen as Schlieffen's successor. Wilhelm was wrong. Moltke had no idea how the Plan was supposed to work, and why it would work. Moltke thought the Plan was far too risky.
Moltke did not feel safe with the small defensive force in the East. He decided that it would need to be strengthened. The source of these men was the right flank of the Western Front. He was afraid to give up German territory so easily in the West, so he strengthened the left flank, again, using men allotted for the right side. The problem with this, is that the right side was to be about ninety percent of the army. Now it was composed of approximately sixty percent of the manpower.[15]
Moltke also was afraid of the political impact of marching through the Netherlands. He was afraid that this would provoke Great Britain into joining the war on the side of France. In an effort to keep some semblance of the Plan, and not devise a totally new plan, Moltke altered the Plan. Now, the German armies would be going through Belgium exclusively.[16] Schlieffen realized that going through the Netherlands was faster and that they would lose less men that way. But since the army would be going through Belgium only, they would be held up at Liege, the only way to get to France. Liege was a heavily fortified citadel, surrounded by twelve forts. Ironically, The French had previously planned on attacking through Belgium and the Netherlands, but England had pressured France not to do so.[17] One final note: Moltke did not believe that Germany could win the war in under six weeks. In his writings, he often referred to problems that he anticipated such as imports, international trade, and national industrial levels. If he believed that the war could be won quickly, he would not have worried about these problems, which are exclusive to long-term wars.[18]
To put it simply, the French and Russian plans for war were total failures. As mentioned before, the French Plan XVII was perfectly suited to allowing the German Army to overrun France. The Russian plans were equally disastrous, depending on a train system that did not exist, and supplies that they did not have, and they did not have the means to transport the supplies if they had them. The Russians wanted to put off fighting the dangerous German Army first, instead concentrating on the weaker Austria. Only after Austria was defeated would Russia face Germany. Under the Schlieffen Plan, of course, France would be ruined before Russia could even be fully mobilized, let alone attack and rout Austria.[19] Later, at the beginning of the war, Russia decided on a two-pronged spearhead into both East Prussia and Austria.[20]
The French military doctrine was based around the tactically and strategically unsound principle of "attack at all costs". Plan XVII is a result of this philosophy. In Plan XVII, about one half of the French Army would be set in the center of the border between France and Germany, and would press into Germany in a great line. The rest of the Army would go swooping into the Alsace-Lorraine regions. After taking these areas, the French would descend upon Germany.[21]
The failure in this plan is that having Alsace-Lorraine would not help the French Army in their attacks, and the whole area was fortified, mountainous, and wooded, making it ideal land to defend in. The French also didn't arm their forces in a manner appropriately for the task they were set to. Instead of being equipped with heavy siege artillery (as the Germans had done in preparation for cities like Liege), the French artillery was almost one hundred percent field guns (light, easily moved artillery pieces). These guns simply did not have the power to destroy forts (as the German guns did).[22]
One last mistake that the French Army had made when equipping their Army was the uniforms. The French had paid no mind whatsoever to practicality or function, only form. The German Army had more useful uniforms, theirs being field grey, a neutral tone which is good for camouflage in the terrain they were fighting in. The German uniform was simple, with no whistles or bells. The French uniform, on the other hand, was bright red and blue, with hat plumes, and such. These uniforms were definitely not very useful for fighting in mountains, forests, and plains.[23]
Since Moltke did not understand the Plan, how could his subordinates be expected to? Well, they had no clue on what the Plan was to accomplish, and since they were given free reign, they proceeded to wreck the Plan.[24] What follows is the execution of the Schlieffen Plan, and note how the Plan differed from what really happened.
The war was theoretically started by Count von Schlieffen himself, who had said that once mobilization had started, war was guaranteed. That was not so. In fact, even after Russian mobilization had started, there was still time for a diplomatic peace.[25] Germany, following this theory, had made no other plans that would fight Russia and France and not bring the whole world into the fight.
After mobilization had started, Kaiser Wilhelm II had ordered Moltke to reverse the action of the Plan, but Moltke couldn't stop the motions of the Army. Later that same day, Moltke was told to "do as he liked". The Plan was put into full effect.[26]
The first twelve days of the War are known as the Battles of the Frontiers. This is because all of the main battles occurred along the borders of France, Germany, and Belgium. The first part of the Battle of the Frontiers occurred at Liege, in Belgium. Liege was a heavily fortified citadel/city, and it was surrounded by twelve strong forts. Thanks to Moltke's modifications to the Plan, the First and Second Armies (the right flank which was to pound France) were forced to go through Liege. This would take time. Added to these problems, the bridges over the Meuse River that went into Liege had been destroyed.[27] During the battle, Liege itself was taken, thanks to quick thinking General Ludendorff, who was later the hero of the Eastern Front, and then the virtual dictator of Germany (with General Paul von Hindenburg). But Ludendorff had taken Liege before any of the surrounding forts could be taken. The whole battle took two days.[28] Without the special German and Austrian heavy artillery guns, the battle probably would have lasted much longer.[29] But, due to the timetable of the Plan, the timetable was set back mere hours. The plan was almost one hundred percent on its tight schedule, and the Allies had no clue on what was happening.[30] Joffre had firmly decided to stick with the flawed Plan XVII.[31]
As the offensive progressed, Moltke was content to stay at the rear of his forces. Unfortunately, this made communication difficult, and without his guidance the Army soon fell into disarray, and the Plan with it.[32] The First Army was placed under the control of the Second Army, but the two Armies' commanders' egos led to fighting between the two, and there was no cooperation, and thus, inefficiency.[33] But Moltke ignored this, as the German Armies rolled to victory after victory. The German heavy artillery continued to demolish many "impregnable" fortresses, while their offensive-defensive doctrine crushed the French Armies repeatedly.
The concept behind the offensive-defensive doctrine is simple. The Armies would be offensive strategically, marching through enemy territory. But when the enemy approached, they would take the defensive and entice the enemy force to attack. Due to the machine gun and artillery, the defending army would emerge victorious, with few casualties, and would proceed to march through enemy territory.[34]
The right wing of the German Army encountered resistance in Belgium after getting through Liege. Although the Belgian Army was small, it fought bravely. But the German Army was far larger, and drove the Belgians all of the way back to Antwerp, the Belgium capital. After that, the Germans could travel all over Belgium without any problems. Also, in Northern France, the Germans encountered the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), led by Sir John French, and the French Fifth Army, commanded by General Lanrezac.[35] Lanrezac was the only Allied general who even had any indication of German strength, movements, and purpose, and he was not totally accurate on these topics. Unfortunately for the French, Joffre did not believe Lanrezac, and scoffed at the idea of the wheeling movement of the German Armies, which Lanrezac had detected.[36] In fact, Joffre was trying to ignore it, so that he could concentrate on his offensive maneuvers.[37]
Added to these problems, was that Lanrezac and Sir John French refused to cooperate, so that instead of working together (and acting as one large force), they acted separately, as two smaller Armies, which were easier for the Germans to destroy. This non-cooperation got so bad, at one point, they did not even tell each other when they were retreating![38]
Meanwhile, on the left wing, the French VII Corps and the German Seventh Army were continually trading the area of Mulhouse in Alsace. Although this led to no strategic gains for either side, it wore out the French, and kept them busy while they could have been rushing to protect Paris from the attack the French thought would never arrive.[39] The German Armies counter-attacked against the failed French drives, and greatly damaged the French Armies. In any other war, this would have been good, but the counter-attacks used up resources which were to be used on the assault against Paris. In fact, despite Lanrezac's warnings, the French were encouraged by the German planned withdrawal, and continued their costly offensive campaign.[40] One of the main reasons that the French suffered so heavily in these attacks was the fact that they still considered bayonet charges to be the best way to rout an enemy. This theory had been discounted time and time again, in the face of withering machine gun fire, but the French still did not get the lesson.[41] Joffre was now seeing that Lanrezac was right, but he still continued with his reckless assault on Alsace-Lorraine.[42] Soon, however (August 25), Joffre realized his mistake, halted all attacks, and went on the defensive.[43]
But the Germans were having their share of problems. Due to poor communication, Moltke's subordinates had too much loose reign, and the Army quickly became uncontrollable.[44] Also, the Germans began the war with just enough manpower to use the Plan if they stuck with it.[45] But, on the left wing, instead of simply retreating, the Germans counter-attacked, which, although it hurt the French, the Germans desperately needed those men.[46] Added to this, Moltke became worried about the battles in the East. To ease his fears about giving up land, he detached troops from the West to go to the East. The commander in the East (now Ludendorff, hero of Liege) declined the troops, but Moltke sent them anyway. Well, while the troops were still en route to the East, the vital battle in the West was being fought at Marne. The loss of these troops (about two corps worth) turned a possible German victory into a German defeat, halting the motion of the Plan, and signaling the start of trench warfare. Not only that, but the major battle in the East, Tannenberg, was fought before the two corps arrived, and the Germans won without them, as Ludendorff knew they would.[47]
After the Battle of the Marne, which the ended the Battles of the Frontiers, the French were completely on the defensive. The Germans, with the Plan's momentum completely stopped, dug in as well. A few simple, three foot deep line in the ground soon became deep trenches. Trench warfare had begun. In the Second Battle of Ypres, the Germans tried to break the stalemate with the use of poison gas. But the allies soon developed counter measures. Although the Germans later made some very successful offensives in 1917, the Allies quickly counter-attacked, bringing the stalemate back. By 1918, the power of the American soldiers was beginning to be felt by the Germans. The war was soon over.
If the Schlieffen Plan had been faithfully utilized, much of the destruction that occurred during this "Great War" would not have happened. Instead, France would have quickly caved in, signed an amazingly humiliating peace treaty, and then Russia would have been destroyed. The Russian Revolution probably would have still happened, but a few years earlier. And Europe might now be singing "Deutschland uber alles". The atom bomb would probably still be a fantasy. But, the Schlieffen Plan was wrecked by Moltke, a good soldier who was a poor leader, and Germany lost the war. Instead, the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, helped to spark World War II, and all of the chaos which ensued. But, of course, the same could have happened had Germany imposed a Treat of Versailles on France and Russia.
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New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987.
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New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1967.
Dupuy, Col. T.N., U.S.A. Ret, A Genius for War.
London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1967.
Encyclopedia Britannica,1975, Vol. 19, s.v. World Wars.
Falls, Cyril, The Great War.
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959.
Goodspeed, D.J., The German Wars.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977.
Griess, Thomas E., ed. The Great War.
New York: Avery Publishing Group, 1986.
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New York: Walker and Company, 1972.
Stokesbury, James L., A Short History of World War I.
New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1981.
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London: George Rainbird, Ltd., 1963.
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New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1966.
"World War I". The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, by R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A. Ret.
New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
[1]Col. T. N. Dupuy, USA Ret., A Genius for War.
(London: MacDonald and Jane's). p. 135
[2]D.J. Goodspeed, The German Wars.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin), p. 149.
[3]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 147
[4]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 145.
[5]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, The Great War.
(New York: Avery Publishing Group), p. 24.
[6]Col. T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War. p. 131.
[7]The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, 1993, s.v. "World War I", by R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. T.N. Dupuy U.S.A. Ret.
[8]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 147.
[9]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 164.
[10]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 147.
[11]R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A., Ret., p. 1022.
[12]Jere Clemens King, The First World War.
(New York: Walker and Company), p. 1.
[13]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 150.
[14]The Encyclopedia Britannica, 1975 ed.
Vol. 19, s.v. "World Wars".
[15]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 148.
[16]Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 947.
[17]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 146.
[18]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 149.
[19]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 150.
[20]R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A. Ret., p. 1020.
[21]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 209.
[22]R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A. Ret.,
p. 1022.
[23]The World Book Encyclopedia, 1965 ed.
Vol. 20, s.v. "World War I".
[24]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 169.
[25]A.J.P. Taylor, The Illustrated Guide to the First World War. (London: George Rainbird Ltd.), p. 15.
[26]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 21.
[27]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 23.
[28]Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S.A. Ret., 1914: The Battles in the West. (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc.), p. 25.
[29]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 24.
[30]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 164.
[31]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 24.
[32]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 31.
[33]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 25.
[34]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 26.
[35]James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I.
(New York: William Morrow and Company), p. 41.
[36]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 27.
[37]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 29.
[38]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 28.
[39]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 165.
[40]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 30.
[41]Irving Werstein, 1914-1918 World War I Told with Pictures. (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.), p. 17.
[42]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 31.
[43]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 167.
[44]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 34.
[45]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 148.
[46]Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, p. 30.
[47]D.J. Goodspeed, p. 170.
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