Plato's Theory of Forms is an attempt to answer questions such as "What is beauty?" and "What is a Man?" The Forms are in a separate state of existence, external to the physical world. They provide a definition for all ideas. They contain the essence of an Idea, and physical objects and Ideas in the physical world are just instances of a Form. The Forms can only be realized through the mind, and only after understanding the Forms can one truly see their appearances in physical objects. Whether or not the Forms provide a definition for everything in the Universe, or simply the more complicated things, is unclear. Plato's theory of the Forms is explained throughout The Republic (notably Books 5, 7, and 10), and then later re-examined from a critical viewpoint in The Parmenides. In this paper, I will explain Plato's Theory of Forms, and then examine it.
Plato introduces the Forms by distinguishing between what he calls "fanciers" and true philosophers. Plato likes to use the example of beauty, because it is something that can be physically represented, and many people claim to understand it. The fanciers, he says, can appreciate beauty when it is found in physical manifestations of beauty, but they cannot appreciate Beauty itself. These fanciers, Plato says, are dreaming. On the other hand, those who can see Beauty itself, understand the essence of Beauty are philosophers, and are awake.[1]
Plato makes an important distinction between knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. He creates entities called "powers," things that allow us to do, like sight and hearing. Because opinion is different from knowledge, they have different powers. Knowledge is the power class that allows us to know, and opinion is the power class that allows us to opine. Thus, that which is knowable, and that which is opinionable, are two distinct things. Because one cannot opine that which isn't, ignorance is separate from opinion, as well as being separate from knowledge. But, because opinion is clearer than ignorance, and not as clear as ignorance, it falls in between the two on the scale of correctness, and is part Truth, and part ignorance, but it is still not Truth.[2]
Because the fancier believes not in a single shape, or Form of things such as these, he can only see their manifestations in the physical world. But in the physical world, nothing is perfect all of the time. Thus, something that appears beautiful will not be beautiful all of the time, or even beautiful to all, because physical objects are subject to opinion, which (as we have discovered) is not Truth, but also not ignorance (or Untruth).[3]
Plato likes to differentiate between empiricism and rationalism. Because the Forms are not actually found in physical objects, they cannot be fully understood through physical objects. Thus, he distinguishes between sense perception (mere opinion, better than ignorance, but not true knowledge) and mental understanding. His Myth of the Sun explains this further. He starts by pointing out that without the Sun, one cannot see physical objects, because light is needed to see. In this analogy, light represents the Forms. Without the Forms, one cannot truly see the physical manifestations of the Forms. For example, if you do not truly understand beauty, you cannot truly see beauty in art, literature, etc. However, all of the Forms come from one, the Superform. In the analogy, the Sun is the Superform. In physical reality, Plato says that the Sun is the premier physical object, from which all others are derived from. This Superform is The Good.[4]
Plato then goes further, by discussing the different levels of understanding. He does this with the Myth of the Divided Line. The line of knowledge and understanding is divided into four parts. The top half, AC, is the realm of knowledge. Within knowledge are two parts, the Forms and Hypothetical Reasoning. Only the philosophers can see and understand the Forms, AB on the line. The Forms are the ultimate in knowing. Hypothetical reasoning (BC) is the type of reasoning used to solve problems, which deal with abstract ideas, and is based upon axioms. Mathematicians, for example, utilize hypothetical reasoning. Plato is somewhat critical of this, because the axioms themselves are never questioned. In addition, mathematicians use diagrams, which are images, and thus, have little to do with the Forms themselves. Because hypothetical reasoning is close to full understanding of the Forms, Plato says that knowledge of math (when Plato speaks of "math," he primarily means geometry) is a pre-requisite to being a philosopher. The second half of the line, DF, is the realm of physical objects. Learning from this half of the line is empiricism, as opposed to the rationalism that Plato promotes. The half closer to Knowledge, DE, represents learning based upon physical objects, that is, sense perception. However, as much as Plato despises this, he considers it preferable to the second half (EF), which is learning from the imagination.[5]
In summation, the Forms encompass the essence of everything. To be a true philosopher, one must understand these Forms. Words cannot describe the Forms, as words are merely physical objects, and thus cannot fully represent the shape or nature of the Forms. Socrates/Plato appears quite confident throughout The Republic in the Truth and logic of the Forms. But there are problems with this theory. One of these doubts is raised in Parmenides.
One of the questions that Parmenides asks of Socrates is if there is a Form for everything that exists, or simply the "important" things.[6] Now here, the theory is trapped between consistency and absurdity. If indeed, there are Forms for everything, then there are an absurd number of Forms, many of which represent inconsequential objects. On the other hand, if the Forms only represent "important" things, what is "important," and what isn't? Plato does not believe in subjectivism, so it is unlikely that he supports the idea that the Forms only represent what is "important"; but he also is not a big fan of absurdity. Here, the Forms come under heavy fire.
Another question that Parmenides asks is if the Forms represent only abstract ideas, such as Truth, Justice, and Beauty, or if the Forms represent more mundane things, such as fire, water, or Man.[7] Again, Socrates does not know, and the Forms are trapped between consistency and infinity. If the Forms only represent abstract ideas, then what of abstractions such as "what is a bird," or "what is a dog?" But if they represent physical objects as well as abstract ideas, then there must be an infinite number of Forms, producing absurdity. More importantly, if the Forms do not represent physical objects, how would physical objects partake of the Forms in their manifestations?
Another paradox which Parmenides brings up regards the concept of participation. Parmenides wants to know if those that partake of the Form partake of the whole Form, or simply a part. Socrates, after much thought, finds both are impossible. Granted, Parmenides cheats a bit by using an analogy from the physical world, but it is a good argument nonetheless.[8] How can this be? The problem with this argument is simply that the Forms are not physical objects, and cannot be expected to follow the bounds of physics. Socrates' analogy of the daylight spreading over the world, and being in many places at once, yet being a whole, is much more like the forms than Parmenides' analogy of a sail being spread over many people, and thus I discount Parmenides' argument here. Additionally, if the Form does indeed partake of the physical world, then the destruction of physical objects would also destroy a part of the Form. It is absurd to think that erasing every circle ever drawn would erase the idea of a circle.
One objection to the Forms that I find reasonable is the Question of the Third Man. This question was originally posed by Plato's students, and Aristotle mentions it in Metaphysics. The Third Man questions Plato's concept of participation. If the physical representations of the Form partake of the Form, and the Form partakes of them, then wouldn't a third Form be created? Once again, Plato runs into a problem with consistency versus logic.
What of the idea of species and individuals? Is there simply a Form for "dog," or is there separate Forms for "Labrador Retriever", "Cocker Spaniel," etc.? What about individuals? Is there a separate Form for "Socrates," "Cindy Crawford," etc.? Like Parmenides' question regarding "important" things, Plato is caught between consistency and absurdity. It would make sense that there be a Form, not necessarily for every individual, but for certain archetypes of individuals; yet to do so would be absurd. If one is to ask the question, "what is a carpenter?" to answer it would require a Form… but there are an infinite number of things that an individual could be.
Under this scrutiny, Plato seems to crack under the weight of consistency versus absurdity. The problem altogether is that Plato tries to make the Forms Universal, but through the infiniteness of the Universe, it would be absurd to attempt to make the Forms Universal. But to break this universality would be inconsistent.
However, Plato's Forms have much in their favor. For one thing, they present a nice, orderly view of things. I rather like the Divided Line; it explains the importance of using rationality to solve problems and find the Truth. Purely rational approaches to the question of Truth are absurd, as the objections to the Forms show, but purely empirical approaches are even worse. The senses are easily deceived. More importantly, if the Truth was to be found simply by taking a walk in the garden, as the empiricists would have us believe, why haven't we found it yet? No, the solution, of course, is to use the physical world as a stimulus to the rationalization process, and as a test for the results.
The Forms also have the advantage of addressing the issue of the differences between physical representations of abstract ideas and the actual idea. There is a large difference, and I agree with Plato's discussion of the difference between those who simply understand the physical representation of the Forms (fanciers) and those who truly understand the Form (philosophers).
Overall, I think that Plato's Forms are generally correct, but have flaws. I think that the Forms do exist, but not in quite the manner that Plato describes. To me, they are not some mystical bodies residing in a separate plane of Being, as Plato seems to think, but simply universal Truths that cannot be refuted. I also do not think that all Forms come from a Superform, but simply are all on the same footing with each other.
The question of the Third Man is important when discussing the matter of participation. I do not think that the Forms partake of their physical manifestations. Instead, I see it as a parent/child relationship: you can see parts of the parents features in the child, and while you could say that the child's features can be seen in the parent for the same reason, you must remember that the child came from the parent. Therefor, the Third Man is not created, because the physical objects are simply subsets of the Form.
In the case of whether or not there is a Form for everything, I believe that it is better to be consistent and absurd than to cave in and be inconsistent. I think this is best, because the realm of matter is not finite, and thus the Forms cannot be, so we might as well extend them to everything. Regarding the subject of species and individuals, I think it is best to have a Form for groups, but not individuals. Having a Form for each individual is nonsense, because many people share enough traits to be considered the same person, for all intents and purposes, while on the other hand, there are enough differences among people to have there be distinct groups of people, like species of dogs, or types of weeds.
In conclusion, I think that Plato is on the right track. The Forms are very close to the Truth, and make much sense. The objections to them are primarily derived from finding paradoxes that would make sense in the material world, but are inapplicable due to the non-physical nature of the Forms. Some faults can be found in the Forms, but they are, in my opinion relatively minor, and while they merit consideration, they show that the theory needs to be further developed and explained, not discounted all together.
[1]The Republic, Book 5, 474a
[2]The Republic, Book 5, 477a -- 479b
[3]The Republic, Book 5, 477b
[4]The Republic, Book 6, 507b -- 508e
[5]The Republic, Book 7, 508e -- 577e
[6]Parmenides, 4d
[7]Parmenides, 4c
[8]Parmenides, 131a -- 131e
I have loved working with computers since I was a kid. I specialized in software development, but I also do a lot of systems administration and some network engineering. Currently, my development interests are in C#, parallel processing, and exploring business usage of dynamic and functional languages. In addition to my day job, I write for TechRepublic, primarily in the "Programming and Development" area, and ForMortals. I am currently (when time permits) working on a book that aims to teach new developers everything about how to write software, other than how to program in and of itself. In addition, I do a bit of software development under the banner of my own company, Titanium Crowbar Industries
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